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Social Host Liability in Pennsylvania:
Coherent Policy or "Judicial
Gymnastics"?
I. Introduction
The problem of drunk driving in America has reached tragic
proportions. Over fifty percent of all highway deaths are alcohol-re-
lated.' Between 1973 and 1983 over 250,000 Americans were killed
in alcohol-related traffic accidents and millions more were injured.'
Dealing with this problem has become one of the foremost legal is-
sues of our day. On the national level it has spawned Supreme Court
cases,$ a presidential commission,4 legislative hearings,5 and legisla-
tion aimed at creating a national minimum drinking age.' In Penn-
sylvania, the problem has resulted in the formation of an executive
task force' and tough new laws aimed at drunk drivers.8 The "war
against drunk drivers" has also prompted numerous interest groups
to debate all sides of the many issues involved.9
This heightened concern with drunk driving has reignited the
I. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1 (Nov. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding that random stops of
motor vehicles upon no reasonable suspicion were unconstitutional "seizures," but court did
not preclude states from developing "less intrusive" methods to spot-check traffic).
4. See Exec. Order No. 12358, 3 C.F.R. comp. 179 (1983) (creating the Presidential
Commission on Drunk Driving). See also Remarks of President Ronald Reagan on Signing
Executive order No. 12358, I PuB. PAPERS 162-63 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of The Com-
mittee on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 619-708 (1982) (concern-
ing federal incentive grants to states to encourage adoption of measures aimed at deterring
drunk driving).
6. See Highway Safety Amendments, Pub. L. 98-363, 98 Stat. 435 (1984).
7. See Governor's Task Force on Drunk Driving, It's Time to Treat Drunk Driving
Like the Crime It Is! (1982) (pamphlet explaining purposes of the task force).
8. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1984) (the "implied
consent" law whereby any person under arrest for driving under the influence who refuses to
submit to chemical testing will have his driver's license suspended for twelve months); 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1984) (mandatory 48 hour jail term for
persons convicted of driving under the influence); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon
1977 & Supp. 1984) (minimum three-year prison term for person who unintentionally causes
the death of another while driving under the influence).
9. See War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to New Fronts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 24, 1984, at 63-64. See also Taylor, Some MADD Ideas on Happy Hour, Philadelphia
Daily News, Jan. 25, 1985 at 10, col. 1.
controversy over what the proper scope of civil liability should be for
purveyors of alcohol when their guests' or customers' overindulgence
results in vehicular mayhem. 10 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania11
recently handed down two decisions that dealt with the civil liability
of social hosts who serve alcohol to guests. In Klein v. Raysinger1
2
the court held that there could be no social host liability for service
of a visibly intoxicated adult whom the host knew was likely to oper-
ate an automobile.1 " The court based its decision on the common law
rule that service of alcohol to an individual cannot be the proximate
cause of any of the consumer's subsequent actions.' 4 In Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co., 15 the court decided that a social host could
be held liable for serving alcohol to a minor who subsequently in-
jures himself.1 6 The court justified this holding with what it found to
be a legislative policy aimed at protecting society from the inherent
danger created when minors consume alcohol. 1" Strong dissents ac-
companied both opinions, one criticizing Klein for its inappropriate
result,18 and the other condemning Congini for its inconsistent
reasoning.' 9
The inconsistency of the decisions seems to result from the ma-
jorities' reliance on undisclosed views about what the ultimate result
of each case should be. These undisclosed "policy reasons" are
camoflauged in the Klein opinion by an outdated and indefensible
doctrine20 and in Congini by a contrived finding of legislative pol-
icy. 2' Such decisions provide little guidance for the future develop-
10. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (common law
action against social host); Hutchens v. Hankins, 61 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, review
denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983) (negligence per se action against commercial
vendor); Comment, Employer Liability for a Drunken Employee's Actions Following an Of-
fice Party: A Cause of Action Under Respondeat Superior, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 107 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Employer Liability]; Note, Social Host Liability for Injuries
Caused by the Act of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D.L. REV. 445 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Social Host Liability].
II. The court was composed of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Nix, Larsen, Fla-
herty, McDermott, Hutchinson and Zappala.
12. 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983). See also infra notes 102-12 and accompanying
text.
13. 504 Pa. at 148, 470 A.2d at 511.
14. See infra note 30.
15. 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983). See also infra notes 113-25 and accompanying
text.
16. 504 Pa. at 164, 470 A.2d at 518.
17. 504 Pa. at 161-62, 470 A.2d at 517-18. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying
text.
18. See 504 Pa. at 149-56, 470 A.2d at 511-15 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (quoting in full
the late Justice Manderino's dissent from Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 242-50, 310 A.2d
75, 77-81 (1973)).
19. See 504 Pa. at 166-68, 470 A.2d at 520-21 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
20. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
ment of the law."2 This proposition is illustrated by the recent Supe-
rior Court decision in Sites v. Cloonan,23 which suggests the
availability of another theory of recovery even though that theory is
inconsistent with the analysis of Klein and Congini.2'
This comment will address the issue of social host liability in
Pennsylvania. It will point out the lack of coherent doctrine, the
omission of relevant policy considerations from judicial opinions, and
the need to have the issue addressed in the public legislative forum.
The legislature could clarify the law, enunciate a current and com-
prehensive policy, and formulate an effective mix of solutions to this
pressing problem. The comment will further point out the improba-
bility that any legislative action will be taken and the resultant need
for a technique of cooperative lawmaking to be initiated through ju-
dicial action.
II. History of Liquor Purveyor Liability
Civil liability for purveyors of alcohol has historically been dealt
with in one of the following four ways:25 1) common law nonliabil-
ity;16 2) liability based on violation of a dram shop or civil damage
act;27 3) liability based on violation of a liquor control statute;28 and
4) liability based on common law negligence principles. 9
22. See Green, Tort Law-Public Law In Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REv. 257, 262 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Green, Tort Law]. After discussing a case in which the court failed to
disclose its reliance on policy considerations, Professor Green concluded: "The possibilities of
tort litigation based on this decision are incalculable." Id. Professor Robert Keeton articulated
the same position in a recent lecture, where he stated the following:
When courts are engaged in the inevitable enterprise of filling gaps in stat-
utes, the value choices they make as legitimate representatives of society will be
wiser as they are better informed by advocacy addressed explicitly to the com-
peting principles, policies and values at stake and as they are openly explained in
judicial opinions.
Lecture by Professor Robert E. Keeton, The Annual Roy R. Roy Lecture given at Southern
Methodist University School of Law (February 24, 1978), reprinted in R. KEETON, STATUTES,
GAPS, AND VALUES IN TORT LAW 20 (1978). These comments are part of an ongoing debate
over the use and articulation of policy considerations in the developing areas of tort law and
the relative merits of judicial versus legislative reform of that law. See infra notes 133-41 and
151-61 and accompanying text.
23. 328 Pa. Super. 481, 477 A.2d 547 (1984).
24. 328 Pa. Super. at 483, 477 A.2d at 548 n.2. The Sites court alluded to the idea
that it may be possible for a defendant to be found to be "more than a social host" if he
possesses enough of the characteristics of a licensee to justify his being held liable as one. This
theory is unworkable in light of the reliance by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upon statutes
to fix standards for imposing liability. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to
place more analytical importance on the characteristics of the consumer of the alcohol than on
its providers.
25. See 22 DuQ. L. REv. 1105, 1111 (1984).
26. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
A. Common Law Nonliability
The common law did not recognize a cause of action against one
who furnished alcoholic beverages to an ordinary, able-bodied man.3 0
Courts maintained that furnishing alcohol could not be the proxi-
mate cause of a drinker's subsequent acts. The causal chain would
be traced back no further than his consumption. This is known as
the "consumption rule." Many commentators attribute this rule to
the Protestant ethic that a person should bear the consequences of
his acts.3"
B. Dram Shop Acts
By the mid-nineteenth century, a complete rejection of the ra-
tionale of the common law consumption rule occurred in states that
enacted dram shop acts.32 These acts were a product of the temper-
ance movement,33 and were drafted to discourage the sale of alcohol
by imposing strict civil liability on tavern keepers if their sales
caused injuries to person, property or means of support.34 Although
generally short-lived,3 5 dram shop acts were important for two rea-
sons. First, they provided a way to compensate innocent third parties
for losses suffered as a result of the "spillover effects" of the liquor
30. 45 AM. JUR. 2D INTOXICATING LIQUORS § 553 (1969). see, e.g., Cherbonnier v.
Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1950); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450
(1955); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co. 248 La. 982, 183 So.2d 328 (1966). In some jurisdictions, this
rule was moderated by allowing recoveries against those who supplied alcohol to persons "in
such a state of helplessness or debauchery as to be deprived of [their] will power or responsi-
bility for [their] behavior." 45 AM. JUR.2D Intoxicating Liquors § 554 (1969). See, e.g., Bissell
v. Starzinger, H 2 Iowa 266, 83 N.W. 1065 (1900) (severe intoxication); Nally v. Blandford,
291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956) (knowledge that patron would attempt to consume entire quart of
whiskey in a short amount of time). See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.3D 528 (1980) (common
law liability for purveyors of liquor).
31. See Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 46, 48
(1973); Comment, Employer Liability, supra note 10, at 108.
32. These acts were also known as Civil Damage Acts. The first one was enacted in
Wisconsin in 1850, and by the turn of the century most states had had one at one time or
another. See generally McGough, Dram Shop Acts, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. OF INS. NEGLI & COM-
PENSATION L. 448.
33. Id.
34. Dean Prosser has defined strict liability as "liability that is imposed on an actor
apart from either (I) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest . . . or (2) a
breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e. actionable negligence." W.P. KEETON, PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 at 534 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]. Although many dram shop acts imposed this strict liability, see. e.g., infra note 44
(Illinois dram shop act imposed strict liability), others required plaintiff to prove that defend-
ant had violated a liquor control statute by serving the individual in question. See. e.g., infra
note 76 (Pennsylvania dram shop act required illegal service). See also Graham, Liability of
the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligence Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WIL-
LIAMETTE L.J. 561, 563-69 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Graham, Liability of the Social Host].
35. The early dram shop acts fell prey to a shift in attitudes towards prohibition during
the Civil War, but in the 1870's many dram shop acts were passed which lasted until prohibi-
tion and beyond. See McGouGH supra note 32 at 449-50.
trade.36 Second, by allowing recovery against purveyors of liquor, the
acts recognized that service of alcohol could be a proximate cause of
injuries.
3 7
Liability through dram shop acts has been limited to commer-
cial purveyors of alcohol.3 8 Courts' refusals to hold social hosts liable
under dram shop acts have generally been based on strict statutory
construction,39 deference to the legislature,4 and fear of inviting an
excessive amount of litigation."1 In Cruse v. Aden,'42 a woman at-
tempted to invoke the Illinois dram shop act 43 to recover from a man
who had furnished her husband two drinks of intoxicating liquor.
Despite the broad wording of the statute, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois reasoned that the statute must be strictly construed because it
was "of a highly penal nature."" Noting that the dram shop act
dealt largely with the regulation of commercial establishments, the
court held that it did not apply to social hosts.45
When courts have interpreted dram shop acts to allow social
host liability, state legislatures have responded by clarifying the
wording of the statutes to prevent future judicial decisions holding
36. The imposition of strict dram shop liability, see supra note 34 (definition), is gener-
ally justified by the theory of enterprise liability; that is, because a business makes a profit
from a product or activity which causes harm to others, the injured persons should be compen-
sated from the profits of the business. See Comment, Liquor, the Law and California: One
Step Forward - Two Steps Backward, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 355, 363-64 (1979). That way,
costs are absorbed into the price of the product and are borne by the producers and consumers
of the product which causes the injuries. See Comment, Torts: Liability of the Social Pur-
veyor, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 204, 206 n.14 (1975). See also infra notes 205-07 and accompanying
text (discussing products liability).
37. See Rappaprt v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 5 (1959). Dram shop acts also,
however, allowed the negligent consumer of alcohol to recover. This issue, in the form of con-
tributory negligence, is still given consideration in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515, 518-19 (1983). See also infra notes 76, 80,
and 120.
38. Graham, Liability of the Social Host, supra note 34, at 563-54.
39. See, e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 127 111. 231, 20b N.E. 73 (1889).
40. See, e.g., Miller v. Moran, 96 lll.App.3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981) ("whether
to provide additional remedies is a legislative rather than a judicial decision."); State ex rel
Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754, 757 (1951) ("the fact that there is no no such
law in Maryland expresses the legislative intent as clearly and compellingly as affirmative
legislation would.").
41. See, e.g, Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 412, 199 N.E. 2d 300
(1964) ("It would open up the floodgates of litigation .... .
42. 127 III. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
43. Dram Shop Act of 1874 (R.S. 1874, 438) (current version at ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch.
43, at 135 (West. Supp. 1983)). Section 9 of the Act reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every husband, wife . . . or other person, who shall be injured in person or
property, or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of
the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action
in his or her own name . . . against any person or persons who shall, by selling
or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part,
of such person or persons . . ..
Id. at § 9.
44. 127 III. at 239, 20 N.E. at 77.
45. Id.
social hosts liable. This has happened on two occasions. In Williams
v. Klemsrud,46 the Supreme Court of Iowa held a private individual
liable under the state's dram shop act.47 The statute provided a
cause of action against "any person" who furnished alcohol to the
individual whose intoxication caused plaintiff's injury.48 The legisla-
ture responded by repealing the old dram shop act and enacting a
new statute that only permits recovery from "any licensee or permit-
tee.' 4  In Ross v. Ross,5" the Supreme Court of Minnesota inter-
preted the word "giving" in their dram shop act51 as evidence of its
application to noncommercial suppliers. Soon after the decision was
handed down, the Minnesota legislature amended the law by delet-
ing the word "giving. '"52
C. Liability Based on Violations of Liquor Control Statutes
The most prevalent method of imposing civil liability is through
a negligence action based on violation of a liquor control statute.53
Such statutes have been enacted in all states and they typically' for-
bid the sale or gift of intoxicating beverages to minors or obviously
intoxicated persons." The statutes create a duty to protect the gen-
eral public from the dangers inherent in serving alcohol to high-risk
persons.55 Violating the statute breaches that duty, and the resulting
46. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972). In Williams, a 21 year old college student pur-
chased a pint of vodka for a minor friend. The minor drank the alcohol, became intoxicated,
and drove into plaintiff's vehicle. Id. at 615.
47. IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West Supp. 1966) (current version at IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 123.92 (West Supp. 1983).
48. Id.
49. Graham, Liability of the Social Host, supra note 34, at 567-68. See IOWA CODE
ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1983).
50. 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972). Defendant purchased liquor for his minor
brother. The minor was killed when, after drinking the liquor and becoming intoxicated, he
drove off the road. The decedent's parents and infant son were awarded damages under the
Minnesota dram shop act.
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1972) (current version at MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984)). The act provided a cause of action "against any person
who, by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors . ) (emphasis supplied).
52. Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 10, at 457.
53. Comment, Negligence Actions Against Liquor Purveyors: Filling the Gap in South
Dakota, 23 S.D.L. REV. 228, 240 (1978). See 22 DUQ. L. REV. 1105, 1114 (1984).
54. See, e.g., N.Y. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 65 (McKinney 1984)
which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No person shall sell deliver or give away . . . any alcoholic beverages to:
I. Any person actually or apparently under the age of nineteen years; 2.
Any intoxicated person or to any person, actually or apparently, under
the influence of liquor; or 3. Any habitual drunkard . ...
Id. For a list of the liquor control statutes existing in all fifty states, see Note, Social Host
Liability, supra note 10, at 447 n.12.
55. Graham, Liability of the Social Host, supra note 34, at 569-70. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286, which provides as follows:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the re-
quirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose pur-
pose is found to be exclusively or in part
intoxication and injury are generally regarded as reasonably
foreseeable.
56
The first use of this method was in Rappaport v. Nichols,57 in
which the Supreme Court of New Jersey held a tavern owner liable
for injuries suffered by a third person in a traffic accident caused by
an intoxicated minor. Defendant had served alcoholic beverages to
the minor in violation of a New Jersey law prohibiting such service.
58
Since Rappaport, this type of action has been used to impose civil
liability on both tavern owners and social hosts for serving both mi-
nors59 and visibly intoxicated adults."0
Use of this method to impose civil liability on social hosts in
California has provoked a negative legislative response. Until 1971,
California adhered to the consumption rule. This was judicially abol-
ished in Vesely v. Sager,6" in which the liability of a tavern owner
was based on his violation of a liquor control statute.62 In 1972, this
liability was extended to a situation in which an employer served a
minor employee in violation of the same statute.63 Finally, in the
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765 (Del. 1978); Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d
828 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The statutes may be held to place all responsibility on the provider of
the liquor. Thus contributory negligence will be no defense, and even the negligent consumer
may recover. See generally PROSSER, supra note 34, at 461, which reads as follows:
[Clontributory negligence of the plaintiff is a complete bar to his action for any
common law negligence of the defendant. Whether it is a bar to the liability of a
defendant who has violated a statutory duty is a matter of the legislative purpose
which the court finds in the statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 B (1965), which provides that "[t]he
unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted
by the court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man is negligence in itself."
See generally Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 670-72, 309 N.E.2d 150, 155-58 (1974).
57. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
58. 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
59. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. Westport Square Ltd., 624 S.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(licensee held liable for serving minor); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich, App. 611, 213 N.W. 2d 820
(1974) (social host held liable for serving minor).
60. See, e.g., Ono v. Applegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980) (licensee held
liable for serving visible intoxicated adult); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.2d 226 (Iowa, 1985) (so-
cial host liable for serving visibly intoxicated adult); Ashlock v. Norris, - Ind. - , 475
N.E.2d 1167 (1985) (same); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (same).
61. 5 Cal.3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
62. Id. The statute in question was CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp.
1970) (current version at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(a) (West Supp. 1984)) which
provided that "[e]very person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or
given away any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously
intoxicated person in guilty of a misdemeanor."
63. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal.App.3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752
(1972).
1978 decision of Coulter v. Superior Court," liability was imposed
on the owner of an apartment complex for serving a visibly intoxi-
cated adult at a tenants' party.65 After Coulter, the legislature abro-
gated all civil liability with the exception of commercial sales to visi-
bly intoxicated minors.66
D. Liability Based on Common Law Negligence Principles
The key to civil liability under standard negligence principles is
the imposition of a duty of care. Where liability has been imposed,
that duty has been found to be a general duty to protect all others
from harm that is a reasonably foreseeable result of one's actions.
'7
Although the existence of a pure common law cause of action has
been mentioned in the context of findings of civil liability for com-
mercial liquor purveyors, the concept has generally been superfluous
in light of applicable liquor control statutes.68 The concept becomes
64. 21 Cal.3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978). See generally Comment,
Social Host Liability for Furnishing Alcohol.- A Legal Hangover?, 10 PAC. L.J. 95 (1979).
65. 21 Cal.3d at 148-49, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536. Although the court
predicated liability on the violation of the statute, it stated in dicta that the case was also an
appropriate one for a common law cause of action in negligence. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673-
75, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538-40.
66. See CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984) which provides as
follows:
(b) No person . . . [who furnishes alcohol to another illegally] shall be civilly
liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted on
that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic
beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that
the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager, Bernard v. Harrah's Club, and
Coulter v. Superior Court be abrogated in favor or prior judicial interpretation
finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries
inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
(citations omitted). The exception is provided in § 25602:1, which states that "a cause of
action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death against
any person licensed . . . who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished, or given
away any alcoholic beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor .
67. See Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980) ("one owes the duty to
every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any
situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care
might result in such injury.") (emphasis in original); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544-45,
476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965) which
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an
invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising
(a) such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other
pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would have
Section 290 requires an actor, in evaluating the risk he is creating, to know "the qualities and
habits of human beings and animals and the qualities, characteristics, and capacities of things
and forces." Id. at § 290.
68. See supra note 65. The common law method has been useful in cases where the
service of alcohol and the resulting injuries took place in different states and state liquor laws
could not be given extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269
F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959) (service in Illinois and resulting accident in Michigan); Colligan v.
important in the area of social host liability, when the applicability
of penal statutes to the host is usually questionable.6 9
Social host liability has been imposed using a pure common law
approach in two jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in
Wiener v. Gama Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,70
held a fraternity liable for knowingly serving a minor when they
knew he had driven to the party and would have to drive home. The
court stated a general rule that "[t]here might be circumstances in
which the host would have a duty to deny his guest further access to
alcohol.1 71 The legislature responded to this case by establishing
threshold standards for the imposition of social host liability for ser-
vice to both minors and visibly intoxicated adults.7' New Jersey has
held social hosts liable in cases involving both minors and visibly in-
toxicated adults.7 3 Although a bill was introduced in the legislature
to abrogate all social host liability, no action has yet been taken.74
III. Civil Liability in Pennsylvania
A. History
1. Commercial Purveyors.-Pennsylvania has imposed civil li-
ability on commercial purveyors of alcohol for over a hundred years.
In 1854, the Commonwealth enacted a dram shop act that permitted
third persons to recover for injuries to person or property resulting
Cousar, 38 III.App.2d 392, 187 N.E.2d (1963) (Illinois and Indiana).
69. Graham, Liability of the Social Host, supra note 34, at 577. See, e.g., supra notes
46-52 and accompanying text; infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
70. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
71. Id. at 630, 485 P.2d at 21-22.
72. The Oregon legislature enacted OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.955 and 30.960 (1983). OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983) provides that "[N]o private host is liable for damages incurred or
caused by an intoxicated social guest unless the private host has served or provided alcoholic
beverages to a social guest when such quest was visibly intoxicated." OR. REV. STAT. § 30.960
(1983) provides as follows:
[N]o licensee, permittee, or social host shall be liable to third persons injured by
or through persons not having reached 21 years of age who obtained alcoholic
beverages from the licensee, permittee or social host unless it is demonstrated
that a reasonable person would have determined that identification exhibited was
altered or did not accurately describe the person to whom the alcoholic liquor
was sold or served.
73. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(social host serving minor); Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1982) (social host serving adult); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219
(1984) (social host serving adult). See 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 719 (1977).
74. A.B. 43 201st. Leg., Ist Sess. (1984). The bill reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
No person, other than a person licensed . . . to sell alcoholic beverages, who
furnishes any alcoholic beverages, to a person at or over the age at which a
person is authorized to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages shall be civilly
liable to any person or the estate of any person for personal injuries or property
damage inflicted as a result of intoxication by the consumer of the alcoholic
beverages.
The bill did not pass during the 1984 Legislative session.
when one person illegally furnishes alcohol to another. 75 The act was
put to its first test in 1861 in Fink v. Garman.76 Until the time of its
repeal, the act was applied to service of both minors77 and intoxi-
cated and intemperate adults.
78
The dram shop act was repealed in 1951 when the Common-
wealth enacted a comprehensive liquor code. 79 Beginning with the
case of Schelin v. Goldberg,8" Pennsylvania courts have imposed lia-
bility based on violations of section 493(1) of the Liquor Code. 81
75. Act of May 8, 1854, P.L. 663, No. 648. Sections one and three of the Act provided,
in pertinent part, as follows:
That wilfully furnishing intoxicating drinks by sale, gift or otherwise to any per-
son of known intemperate habits, to a minor, or to an insane person for use as a
beverage shall be held and deemed a misdemeanor ... and the wilful furnishing
of intoxicating drinks as a beverage to any person when drunk or intoxicated
shall be deemed a misdemeanor . . .That any person furnishing intoxicating
drinks to any other person in violation of any existing law, or of the provisions of
this acts [sic], shall be held civilly responsible for any injury to person or prop-
erty in consequence of such furnishing, and anyone aggrieved may recover full
damages against such person so furnishing ....
The Act was different from usual dram shop acts in that 1) it required an illegal act rather
than imposing strict liability; and 2) it only authorized compensation for injuries to persons
and property. Losses to means of support were dealt with through the use of the wrongful
death and survival acts. See infra note 77.
76. 40 Pa. 95 (1861). In Fink, a woman recovered from a tavern keeper who served her
husband while he was intoxicated. As a result of the intoxication, the husband fell to his death
under the wheels of his wagon. Id. at 98-99. The action was actually brought under the wrong-
ful death and survival acts, see Act of April 15, 1851 P.L. 674, No. 358 § 19 (survival act);
Act of April 26, 1855 P.L. 309, No. 323, § I (wrongful death), but the required finding of
negligence was predicated upon the dram shop act. 40 Pa. at 104. In commenting on the
defendant's action, Justice Woodward stated that "[n]o standard of social duty, or of obedi-
ence to law, can be applied to Fink's act which will not prove it to have been in a very eminent
sense unlawful negligence." Id. He refused to recognize contributory negligence as a defense,
stating that the decedent, at the time of the service, had been incapable of legal acts. Id. at
106. See also supra note 37. In concluding, he stated: "As the judicial tribunals did not make
the law, they have no power to lessen its exactions, and, looking to the humane purposes of the
legislation, they have no disposition to thwart it by glosses and refinements." Id.
77. See, e.g., McKinney v. Foster, 391 Pa. 221, 137 A.2d 502 (1958); Manning v.
Yokas, 389 Pa. 136, 132 A.2d 198 (1957) (minors).
78. See, e.g., Davies v. McKnight, 146 Pa. 610, 23 A. 320 (1892) (intoxicated adult);
Bier v. Myers, 61 Pa. Super. 158 (1915) (intoxicated and intemperate); Littell v. Young, 5 Pa.
Super. 205 (1897) (intemperate); Carbaugh v. Grove, 84 Pa. D & C 489 (1950) (intoxicated);
McKusker v. Quinn, 26 Pa. D. 499 (1917) (intoxicated).
79. Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, No. 179 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
47 §§1-101 - 1-796 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1984)).
80. 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958). In Schelin, plaintiff was served alcohol
in defendant's bar while visibly intoxicated. As he was leaving, he was attacked and severely
injured by another patron. The court found defendant negligent based on his violation of the
liquor control statute, see infra note 32, and held that, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not
be found contributorily negligent. Id. at 350, 146 A.2d at 653. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 483 (1965), which provides as follows:
The plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery for the negligence of the
defendant consisting of the violation of a statute, unless the effect of the statute
is to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the
defendant.
Id.
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 4-493(l) (Purdon 1969). Section 493(1) provides, in perti-
nent part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful . . . [flor any licensee or the board, or any employe[e],
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court implied that licensees could
be held liable for serving a minor even without a showing of visible
intoxication,8 2 the General Assembly added Section 49783 to the
Code. Section 497 requires a showing of visible intoxication before a
licensee may be held liable. Thus, civil liability is now imposed only
on licensees who serve alcohol to visibly intoxicated adults or
minors.84
2. Social Hosts.-In Commonwealth v. Randall,8 5 the words
"or any other person" were construed by the Superior Court to in-
clude noncommercial liquor providers within the confines of section
493(1). In Manning v. Andy,86 a plaintiff attempted to apply that
servant or agent of such licensee or of the board, or any other person, to sell,
furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages . . . to any person visibly
intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards,
or persons of known intemperate habits.
Plaintiff must then prove that intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury. See Majors v.
Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 270-71, 205 A.2d 873, 877 (1965). In Majors, the court stated
that "[c]ausation is as much a part of negligence actions based upon statutory violations as it
is of purely common law actions." The court stated that "in order to find the defendant proxi-
mately caused an injury it must be found that his allegedly wrongful conduct was a substantial
factor in bringing about plaintiff's injury even though it need not be the only factor," and held
that defendant could escape liability if he could show that plaintiff's injury would have oc-
curred even without the negligent conduct of the defendant. Id. at 271, 205 A.2d at 877.
82. See Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963). Plaintiff, a minor, was
served intoxicants at defendant's place of business while he was visibly intoxicated. He was
subsequently injured when he drove his automobile off the road. Justice Eagen stated: "That
the serving of intoxicants to minors or to visibly intoxicated persons are separate and distinct
violations, there can be no doubt." Id. at 144, 190 A.2d at 442 (emphasis in original). He
stressed, however, that while the illegal service would constitute negligence per se, plaintiff
would have to show that his injuries were a result of intoxication in order to establish the
requisite proximate cause. Id. at 146, 190 A.2d at 443.
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 4-497 (Purdon 1969). Section 497 provides as follows:
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on account of damages inflicted upon
them off of the licensed premises by customers of the licensee unless the cus-
tomer who inflicts the damages was sold, furnished or given liquor or malt or
brewed beverages by the said licensee or his agent, servant or employee when the
said customer was visibly intoxicated.
Id. In Simon v. Shirley, 269 Pa. Super. 364, 409 A.2d 1365 (1979), § 497 was held to pre-
clude civil liability for illegal service of a minor absent a showing of visible intoxication at the
time of such service.
84. See, e.g., Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550
(1964) (adult); Simon v. Shirley, 269 Pa. Super. 364, 409 A.2d 1365 (1979) (minor).
85. 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276 (1957). Randall involved a criminal application
of the law. Defendants, private individuals, were convicted of furnishing liquor to minors. In
interpreting the meaning of the worlds "or any other person" in § 493(1), Judge Ervin stated:
The doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of construction to aid in ascertain-
ing and giving effect to the legislative intent, where there is uncertainty, and
does not warrant the court in subverting or defeating the legislative will be con-
fining the operation of a statute within narrower limits than intended . ...
Id. at 614, 133 A.2d at 281 (quoting 50 AM. JUR. Statutes § 250).
86. 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973). Plaintiff was an employee of defendant. She had
attended a party sponsored by defendant and was injured in an automobile accident while
riding home with a co-employee. The complaint alleged that the employee had been served
alcoholic beverages while in a visibly intoxicated state. The trial court dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action in negligence. Id. at 238-39, 310 A.2d at 75-76.
construction in the context of a civil suit against a social host. The
supreme court87 refused to adopt the Randall construction. The
court held that section 493(1) applied only to licensed persons en-
gaged in selling intoxicants.88 The per curiam opinion concluded
with the following statement: "[W]hile appellant's proposal may
have merit, we feel that a decision of this monumental nature is best
left to the legislature.
'a9
Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Roberts, dissented
strongly, setting forth a detailed rationale for imposing liability
under either a pure negligence or a statutory violation theory.90 He
began by noting the trend toward abolishing immunities that deprive
citizens of their constitutionally guaranteed "day in court,"91 and
then charged the majority with countering this trend by establishing
a new immunity.9" Next, arguing that trial of the case was not lim-
ited to a statutory cause of action, he applied a pure negligence anal-
ysis.93 Stating that serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person was
certainly not "reasonable" behavior under a negligence definition, he
stressed that the chain of events leading from intoxication to injury
was readily foreseeable.' He felt that the plaintiff should be given
an opportunity to prove her case in court.
Turning to the statutory violation theory, Justice Manderino
adopted the superior court's construction of section 493(1) set forth
in Randall."5 He stressed that, out of twenty-five separate subparts
87. The court consisted of Chief Justice Jones and and Justices Eagen, O'Brien, Rob-
erts, Pomeroy, Nix, and Manderino. The decision was per curiam; Justice Pomeroy filed a
concurring opinion; and Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Roberts, dissented.
88. 454 Pa. at 239, 310 A.2d at 76.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 242-50, 310 A.2d at 77-81.
91. Id. at 242, 310 A.2d at 77-78 (citing PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11) ("every man for any
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of
law..."). Accord Littell v. Young, 5 Pa. Super. 205, 214 (1897) ("In enacting the statute of
May 8, 1854, the legislature followed the clear analogies of the common law which for most
injuries to persons or property provide a remedy for the private wrong to the person injured by
a civil suit for damages and for the public wrong by indictment.") See also J. LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 4-11 (T. Peardon ed. 1952) (discussion of-the vindication
of "natural law" through the legal system). See generally infra note 179 and accompanying
text.
92. 454 Pa. at 242-43, 310 A.2d at 77-78.
93. Id. at 243-44, 310 A.2d at 78-79 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286).
For the text of that section see supra note 55.
94. 454 Pa. at 245, 310 A.2d at 78-79. Justice Manderino stressed that since the de-
fendant's act could easily be found to be the cause in fact of the injury, the only thing that
could prevent it from being held as the legal cause would be the finding of an intervening
superceding cause. Id. See generally PROSSER supra note 34 at §§ 41-45 (discussing proximate
cause). He stated that the driver's intervening negligent act could not be a superceding cause
if: a) defendant should have realized that he would so act; or b) the act was not highly ex-
traordinary; or c) the driver's conduct was a normal consequence of defendant's conduct and
the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. 454 Pa. at 245, 310 A.2d at 78-
79 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447).
95. 454 Pa. at 245, 310 A.2d at 79.
under section 493, only 493(1) included the words "or any other per-
son" in addition to words referring to the Liquor Control Board and
commercial licensees.96 He noted that if the statute were adopted as
a negligence standard, the purpose of such adoption would be to fur-
ther the general policy of the legislation.97 He then quoted the state-
ment of legislative policy from the statute, which stated that the
statute should be liberally construed to protect the general welfare of
the Commonwealth's citizens.9 He concluded by stating that fear of
inviting a deluge of litigation was no justification for denying citizens
a legal remedy for their injuries.99
Justice Pomeroy, in his concurring opinion, stated that it was
inappropriate to hold social hosts to the strict standard of civil liabil-
ity governing statutory violations by commercial vendors. 100 He did,
however, think that a pure negligence action should be available
against a social host who serves liquor to someone whom he knows or
should know is intoxicated and is likely to drive. 101
B. Present State of Social Host Liability in Pennsylvania
The pure negligence action against a social host that Justice
Pomeroy encouraged in Manning came before the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court ten years later in Klein v. Raysinger.02 Justice McDer-
mott, writing for the majority, made short work of the case. He
noted that only three jurisdictions recognized such a cause of action:
California,'0 3  New Jersey, 0 4 and Oregon. 10 5 He then dismissed
Coulter because of its subsequent legislative abrogation.10 6 Figuly
96. Id. at 247, 310 A.2d at 79-80. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 4-493 (Purdon 1969).
97. Id. at 247, 310 A.2d at 80. See infra text accompanying note 137.
98. Id. (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 1-104(a) (Purdon 1969). Section 1-104(a) of
the liquor code reads as follows:
This act shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the Common-
wealth for the protection of the public welfare, health, peace and morals of the
people of the Commonwealth and to prohibit forever the open saloon, and all of
the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of
this purpose.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 1-104(d) (Purdon 1969) (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 249, 310 A.2d at 81 (quoting Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 435 Pa.
584, 595-96, 305 A.2d 877, 882 (1973), which abrogated sovereign immunity).
100. 454 Pa. at 240-42, 310 A.2d at 76-77.
101. Id. at 242, 310 A.2d 77.
102. 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983). The court stated the issue of the case as
whether a cause of action in negligence would lie against a social host who served a visibly
intoxicated adult guest when the host knows or should know that the guest intends to drive a
motor vehicle. Id. at 144-45, 470 A.2d at 508.
103. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978). See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
104. Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1982).
See supra note 74. Kelly v. Gwinnell had not yet been decided.
105. Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485
P.2d 18 (1981). See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
106. 504 Pa. at 145, 470 A.2d 509.
was dismissed as weak authority due to its status as an unappealed
trial-level decision. 10 7 Finally, he distinguished Weiner by noting that
it involved service of a minor and therefore resembled cases in other
jurisdictions allowing liability for such an act.1"8 Noting the lack of
supporting authority, he refused to recognize the cause of action.10'
The holding was stated in terms of the common law consumption
rule: that consumption of alcohol, rather than its furnishing, is the
proximate cause of any subsequent occurrence.'1 Chief Justice Rob-
erts, who had sided with Justice Manderino in Manning, dis-
sented,' basing his opinion on the Randall interpretation of section
493(1). Justice Larsen quoted in full Justice Manderino's dissenting
opinion from Manning in support of his view of the case."'
The same day Klein was decided, the court decided Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co.,'" which dealt with a social host who served
alcohol to a minor. Justice McDermott, again writing for the major-
ity, distinguished Congini from Klein in two respects. First, he noted
that Congini dealt with service of a minor.1 " Second, he pointed out'
that recovery was being sought by the consumer of the intoxicants
rather than an innocent third party. 5 In holding the host liable, the
court took special note of the existence of a statute forbidding mi-
nors from purchasing or consuming any alcoholic beverage."16 This
statute, the justice stated, "represents an obvious legislative decision
to protect both minors and the public at large from the perceived
deleterious effects of serving alcohol to persons under twenty-one
years of age."' 1 7 The court noted that any adult who furnished alco-
hol to a minor could be found guilty as an accomplice to the minor's
107. Id.
108. Id. at 146-47, 470 A.2d at 509-10.
109. Id. at 148, 470 A.2d at 510-11.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 149, 470 A.2d at 511 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The use of the language
'any other person' clearly manifests a legislative intent to impose an obligation upon all per-
sons to refrain from furnishing alcoholic beverages to visibly intoxicated persons in circum-
stances which create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to third parties.").
112. Id. at 149-56, 470 A.2d at 511-15 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
113. 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983). Plaintiff was an 18-year-old employee of de-
fendant. He was served alcoholic beverages at defendant's Christmas party and became intoxi-
cated. Defendant, through one of its agents, had control of plaintiff's car keys but the agent,
knowing plaintiffs condition, nonetheless turned the keys over to him. Plaintiff attempted to
drive home and was involved in an accident that left him totally and permanently disabled.
114. Id. at 160, 470 A.2d at 517.
115. Id. Considering the basis for the consumption rule, that fact would not seem to
support a finding of liability in Congini rather than Klein.
116. Id. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308 (Purdon 1983). Section 6308 states that
"[a] person commits a summary offense if he, being less than 21 years of age, attempts to
purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or transports any alcohol, liquor or malt or brewed
beverages." Id.
117. 504 Pa. at 162, 470 A.2d at 518.
offense under the general accomplice liability statute.11 ' It then
stated that these two legislative enactments created a standard
which, when violated, could be used to impose civil liability." 9 Sum-
marizing his holding, Justice McDermott stated: "Under our analy-
sis, the actor's negligence exists in furnishing intoxicants to a class of
persons legislatively determined to be incompetent to handle its ef-
fects. It is the person's service which forms the basis of the cause of
action . . ."120
Justice Zappala responded to this blatant dismissal of the con-
sumption rule with a blistering dissent. 2 ' He felt that the majority
was, in effect, overruling Klein with its holding.'22 He reasoned:
If it is consumption by an adult guest, rather than the furnishing
of alcohol by a host which is the proximate cause of subsequent
occurrences, then it is not less compelling to conclude that it is a
minor's voluntary consumption of alcohol which is the proximate
cause of harm which results.1
2 3
In a final volley, he stated: "This matter is better left to legislative
action than judicial gymnastics.
'12
Although his rationale and result are not desirable, 2 5 Justice
Zappala's statement of the problem is quite accurate. While the
118. Id. at 161, 470 A.2d at 517. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306 (Purdon 1983).
119. 504 Pa. at 162, 470 A.2d at 517-18 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
286 (1965). See supra note 55 (for text of § 286). The court also held that defendant could
assert Congini's contributory negligence as a defense. They based this on two factors: that an
18-year-old person is presumptively capable of negligence, and that Congini had violated a
statute by consuming alcohol. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 469 (1965) (an unex-
cused violation of a statute enacted for the actor's protection is contributory negligence in
itself). No mention was made of the historical absence of the contributory negligence defense
in cases where alcohol is involved. See, e.g., Davies v. McKnight, 146 Pa. 610, 23 A. 320
(1892) ("[A holding of contributory negligence] would practically destroy the [dram shop
act]"); Littell v. Young, 5 Pa. Super. 205 (1897) ("[A] man cannot put liquor into another so
as to destroy his capacity to take care of himself and then charge him with being guilty of
contributory negligence because he does not take care of himself."); but cf. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 25-26 (1769) ("[a]s to ... drunkenness or intoxi-
cation...; our law looks upon this as an aggravation of the offense, rather than as an excuse
.... "). The court noted that under the comparative negligence statute, the factfinder would
determine whether Congini would be barred from recovery. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7102 (Purdon 1983) (plaintiff's negligence will not bar recovery unless it is "greater than" that
of the defendant).
120. 504 Pa. at 163, 470 A.2d at 518.
121. Id. at 166-68, 470 A.2d at 520-21 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 168, 470 A.2d at 521.
124. Id. ("The reasoning applied in Klein should be applied to this case as well, rather
than upon 'public policy' which may be manipulated to support what the majority believes is a
better result.") See also Farage & McBride, Annual Survey of Significant Developments in
the Law: Tort Law, 1985 PA. B.A.Q. 24, 43 ("[Tlhe 'proximate cause' language represents
invocatory words which describe the result which the Court desires to reach, and not the rea-
son for the result.") [hereinafter cited as Farage & McBride].
125. Justice Zappala would have the court adhere strictly to the old common law con-
sumption rule. It is the position of this comment that that rule is outmoded, indefensible, and
should be abandoned. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
courts' treatment of commercial purveyors is adequate in light of the
available clear-cut legislative guidelines, its handling of the social
host is characterized by issue avoidance resulting in incoherent pol-
icy.12 In the court's one paragraph Manning opinion, it cited Jar-
dine v. Upper Darby Lodge,1 1 7 a case dealing with a liquor licensee,
for the proposition that section 493(1) did not apply to noncommer-
cial liquor purveyors. 28 Although Jardine is probably the most
widely cited case in support of a nonstatutory cause of action,' 29 the
court ignored that analytical avenue. Instead, without even analyzing
existing statutes, the court deferred to the legislature.130 When a
pure negligence action was finally brought before them in Klein, the
court hid behind the old common law consumption rule. This archaic
perversion of proximate cause doctrine has been virtually abandoned
by modern courts' adoption of the "negligence in the air" concept
and reliance on foreseeability to determine proximate cause issues. 8'
126. See infra notes 127-141 and accompanying text. See also Farage and McBride, 24,
43 ("[wlhat would happen if the social host got an 18 year old drunk and the latter then
crashed into another vehicle, injuring third persons who are innocent, but no more than the
third persons denied recovery under [the Klein] opinion?").
127. 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
128. In Jardine, an adult drank all night in defendant's tavern and, shortly after leaving,
drove his car into two pedestrians. Defendant argued that the repeal of the dram shop act
demonstrated a legislative intent not to impose liability. The court replied that "[wihen an act
embodying in expressed terms a principle of law is repealed by the legislature, then the princi-
ple as its existed at common law is still in force." Id. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553 (quoting Schelin
v. Goldberg, supra note 80 at 651). The court then pointed out the legislative determination
through 493(l) that serving an intoxicated person was dangerous, and concluded by stating the
following: "The first prime requisite to de-intoxicate one who has, because of alcohol, lost
control over his reflexes, judgment and sense of responsibility to others is to stop pouring alco-
hol into him. This is a duty which everyone owes to society and to law entirely apart from any
statute." Id. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553. The court made no effort to explain its reliance on
Jardine, and the case is far from being a conclusive rejection of social host liability.
129. See, e.g., Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 674 (Alaska 1981); Ono v. Applegate,
62 Hawaii 131, 136, 612 P.2d 533, 539 n.5 (1980); Comment, California Liquor Liability:
Who's to Pay the Costs? 15 CAL. W.L.REv. 490, 509-10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, California Liquor Liability]; Comment, Negligence Actions Against Liquor Purveyors:
Filling the Gap in South Dakota, 23 S.D.L.REv. 228, 233 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Filling the Gap].
130. 454 Pa. at 239, 310 A.2d at 76.
131. The term "negligence in the air" comes from the now famous case of Palsgraff v.
Long Island R.R. Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), where Justice Cardozo, addressing
the issue of the unforeseeable plaintiff, wrote "Proof of 'negligence in the air' ... will not do."
Id. (quoting POLLOCK, TORTS 455 (11 th ed)). This was in response to Justice Andrews' dis-
sent, where Andrews posited that "[e]very one owes to the world at large a duty of refraining
from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others." Id. at 350, 162 N.E. at
103. See also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
The consumption rule has been described as "a back-eddy running counter to the main-
stream of modern tort doctrine." Fuller v. Standard Stations Inc., 250 Cal.App.2d. 687, 691,
58 Cal. Rptr. 792, 794 (1967). The Fuller court went on to say the following: "Current judi-
cial analysis considers the outer boundaries of negligence liability in terms of duty of care
rather than proximate causation. [Duty] rests in part upon social policy factors, in part upon
an inquiry whether the actor's conduct involves a foreseeable risk to persons in the plaintiffs
position." Id. Accord Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 144, 152-53 577 P.2d 669, 674-75,
145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Frater-
nity, 258 Or. 632, 636, 458 P.2d 18, 21 (1971).
Courts in Pennsylvania have been consistently liberal in their proxi-
mate cause determinations in cases dealing with the civil liability of
liquor purveyors."'
In Congini, the court partially extricated itself from its proxi-
mate cause dilemma but, in so doing, created a glaring inconsistency
in its handling of social host liability. Serving alcohol to a minor,
especially one who exhibits no outward manifestations of intoxica-
tion, creates no more foreseeable risk of harm than serving alcohol to
a visibly intoxicated adult. While there may be valid policy argu-
ments for making this distinction, 3" liquor laws have consistently
treated these two classes the same." 4 In making the distinction, the
court did not provide policy justifications, but instead based its hold-
ing on a questionable finding of legislative intent. 35 The court began
with a statute aimed at deterring minors from obtaining alcohol for
themselves. It then bootstrapped that statute to a general criminal
accomplice statute and declared that its new creation was legislative
policy justifying a negligence standard aimed at imposing liability on
hosts who serve alcohol to minors. Although it is true that both of
these statutes are directly applicable to the actors in such a situa-
tion, 13 6 when a court is seeking to discern legislative policy, direct
applicability can and should bow to the search for a statute that
enunciates a policy more generally applicable to the problem posed
by the case. 87 Such a statute would be, for this case, section 493(1)
of the Liquor Code, 3 8 which applies to the supplying of alcohol by a
132. See, e.g., Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965) (plaintiff
climbed out sixth-floor bathroom window and fell off fenced-in roof); Corcoran v. McNeal, 400
Pa. 121, 161 A.2d 367 (1960) ("The proprieter of an establishment whose employees pour
inflammable liquid into a vessel already too full cannot plead ignorance of results when the
vessel explodes from contact with the slightest spark."); McKinney v. Foster, 391 Pa. 221, 137
A.2d 502 (1958) (minor plaintiff was served two or three beers and had an accident one and
one half hours later, six miles from defendant's establishment); Davies v. McKnight, 146 Pa.
610, 23 A. 320 (1892) (decedent died of pneumonia contracted when he got drunk and passed
out in a gutter); Bier v. Myers, 61 Pa. Super. 158 (1915) (plaintiff left saloon "staggering
drunk"; his mangled body was found several hours later on a railroad track far from the
nearest crossing).
133. See infra note 141.
134. See Act of May 8, 1854 P.L. 663, No. 648 (includes minors, visibly intoxicated
persons, insane persons, and habitual drunkards); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 493(1) (Purdon
1969) (same). See supra notes 75 and 81 (for text).
135. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text. Current events provide an illus-
tration of the questionable efficacy of trying to ascertain the intent of the Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly. That body recently passed a law intending to liberalize Sunday sales of liquor,
only to find out some time later that they had inadvertently legalized tavern gambling. See R.
Kirkpatrick, How a Sunday Liquor Bill Became a Law Allowing Cash Card Tournament (AP
News Analysis, Jan. 9, 1985). See also infra note 142.
136. See Congini v. Portersville Valve Co. 504 Pa. 157, 164, 470 A.2d 515, 518 n.3
(1983). Direct applicability was what the court used to distinguish Congini from Manning v.
Andy.
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 comment b (1965).
138. See supra note 81.
liquor purveyor to a high-risk class of persons. A further problem
with the Congini approach is its flouting of the policy enunciated in
section 497 of the Liquor Code.8 9 Although that statute is not spe-
cifically applicable to noncommercial purveyors of alcohol, it does set
a standard of care. By not limiting the Congini opinion to cases in-
volving visibly intoxicated minors, the court has imposed a higher
standard of care on social hosts than that applied to commercial pur-
veyors. 4 1 This is inconsistent with any policy reasons that may exist
for differentiating between the treatment of social and commercial
liquor purveyors."'
IV. In Search of an End to Judicial Gymnastics
A. The Need for Legislative Action
An analysis of Klein and Congini illustrates the need for legisla-
tive reform of Pennsylvania's laws governing civil liability of purvey-
ors of alcohol. Since there is no existing statute declaring where civil
liability does and does not lie and since courts refuse to strike out on
their own via the pure common law route, they are left chasing the
elusive apparition of legislative intent." 2 They are forced to adopt or
reject legislative language or policy as they seek a standard for im-
posing or denying civil liability. If a court decides to enter the fray,
there seems no end to the differing statutes, judicial constructions of
statutes, and combinations thereof which it may use to craft a ra-
tionale for its decision"'8-whether or not that rationale played any
139. See supra note 83.
140. See Mancuso v. Bradshaw, 338 Pa. Super. 328, 487 A.2d 990 (1985) (licensee
can't be held liable for serving minor absent showing of visible intoxication regardless of the
standard set for social hosts by Congini).
141. Id.
142. Concerning the divination of legislative intent from statutes, Hobbes wrote the
following:
[I]nsomuch as no written law, delivered in few or many words, can be well un-
derstood without a perfect understanding of the final causes for which the law
was made, the knowledge of which final causes is in the legislator. To him,
therefore, there cannot be any knot in the law insoluble, either by finding out the
ends to undo it by, or else by making what ends he will . . . by the legislative
power, which no other interpreter can do.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 218-19 (H. Schneider ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN]. See generally Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L.REv. 1 (1957) (critique of a Supreme Court case involving
statutory construction).
143. The choices include the Manning statutory method of denying liability for service
of a visibly intoxicated adult, see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text; Justice Mander-
ino's statutory or common law negligence theories for imposition of such liability, see supra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text; and the Congini criminal accomplice approach, see supra
notes 113-20 and accompanying text. The latter could either include or forego the § 497 re-
quirement of visible intoxication. See supra notes 83 and accompanying text. In addition, it
could be argued social host liability has existed since the enactment of the dram shop act.
The dram shop act imposed liability on anyone who served liquor "in violation of any
existing law," and, in addition, made service by "any person" of minors and visibly intoxicated
part in the actual making of the decision.
Maintaining the integrity of the legal system is not the only
compelling reason for legislative action on this issue. Drunk driving
is a pressing national problem and the focus of much public atten-
tion. 14 The decisions discussing when to impose liability determine
who will bear the monumental costs generated each year as a result
of alcohol abuse.'" A problem that touches us all in some way de-
serves to be debated and decided in a public forum, not a judicial
chamber. 14" Further, the history of this area of the law demonstrates
that its evolution has been affected by changes in both public opinion
and technological innovation. 147 Evidence of the current trend may
be found by turning to the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driv-
adults, among others, a misdemeanor. See supra note 75. A 1933 liquor control act made it
illegal "for any licensee or the board, or any employee, servant or agent of such licensee or of
the board, to see, furnish or give" intoxicating liquor to the same class of high-risk consumers.
Act of November 29, 1933 P.L. 15 No. 4 § 602(e) (Special Session 1933-34), as amended by
Act of June 10, 1937 P.L. 1762 No. § 602(5). This act did not repeal any part of the dram
shop act. Id. The dram shop act was not repealed until the Act of April 12, 1951, supra note
79, which made it illegal "[flor any licensee or the board, or any employee, servant or agent of
such licensee or of the board or any other person, to sell, furnish or give" intoxicating liquor to
high-risk individuals. Id. (emphasis supplied). The Historical Note to the codification of that
act, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 at 358 (Purdon 1969), states that "[t]he words 'or any other
person' inserted in clause (1) above, were included in said penal clause in order to entirely
supply section I of the Act of 1854, May 8, P.L. 663." Id. In Commonwealth v. Wilhelm, 6
Pa.C. 30 (1887), a private individual was convicted under the existing penal law for providing
liquor to a known drunkard. Judge Archibald opined as follows:
It seems to me if I should declare that this was not a furnishing, it might lead to
the evasion of the law, and it is a question whether a person who should lend
himself to obtaining liquor for a person of known intemperate habits in this way
would not be amenable to this statute.
It is quote broad in its terms, and while we should not strain at the con-
struction which will make an act criminal, we should not allow evasions to creep
in which would avoid the intended effect of the statute.
Id. at 31.
Finally, it seems that a court could treat the issue of contributory negligence in many and
varied ways. Compare notes 37, 76, 80, and 119.
144. In 1981, there were 1,093,884 drunk driving arrests nationwide. U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE. SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 461 (1983). In addition, a 1982 Gallup
Poll showed that 89 percent of Americans favored stricter drunk driving laws. Id. at 300. See
also Alcohol on the Rocks, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 1984 at 52-54; supra notes 1-9 and accom-
panying text.
145. Estimates of these costs range from 21 to 24 billion dollars annually. FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note I at 1.
146. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and The Judicial Process: The Lin-
coln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1957) ("The popular voice which expresses without
inhibition what is wanted in the way of immediate palpable results should be heard somewhere
and Congress is that place."). See also infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 33 and 35 and accompanying text. See also Halvorson v. Birchfield
Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash.2d 759, 765, 458 P.2d 897, 901-02 (1969) (Finley, J., dissenting). Judge
Finley, speaking of the consumption rule stated the following:
Such reasoning is far more persuasive when a drunkard is annoying or assaulting
a passerby, riding a horse, or driving his carriage through the village street at
the breathtaking speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour, than when an inebriate is in
incompetent control of a two-ton metal juggernaut powered by three hundred
horsepower.
Id.; 22 DUQ. L. REV. 1105, 1112-13 (1984).
ing, which recommended that each state enact a dram shop act.148
The Pennsylvania General Assembly has not addressed this problem
since 1965.149 The present legislature should address the issue so that
its specific pronouncements can enable courts to deal with the prob-
lem as it presently stands. The courts should not have to infer legis-
lative intent from laws enacted two decades ago. 5
B. Reality of Legislative Inaction
Legislatures are not always the best places to turn for reform of
tort law. Two reasons prompt this conclusion. First, the majority of
state legislators are not lawyers.' 5' This absence of legal training
makes it less likely that a state legislator will take an interest in tort
law reform.' 52 It also makes it less likely that a legislator will be able
to master the necessary background to make a meaningful evalua-
tion of the problem and its possible solutions. 53 Second, the most
imposing obstacle to dram shop legislation is harsh political reality.
Legislation is typically conceived or aborted in response to the ac-
tions of organized special interests' 5 -which in this case are the li-
quor and insurance lobbies.15 5 Any opposing forces in the battle to
148. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1 at 11.
149. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (enactment of § 4-497 of the liquor
code).
150. Compare supra note 147 with notes 135, 142, and 144. Even if the legislature had
actually addressed the issue of social host liability in the past, social conditions and public
opinion have changed.
15 1. See J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law,
48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 271 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Peck, Reform]. For example, 34 out of
203 members of the Pennsylvania House of Representative during the 1983-84 session had law
degrees. See COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. LEGISLATIVE
DIRECTORY (1983-84).
152. Peck, Reform, supra note 151 at 270-75. Besides lack of exposure to theoretical
legal principles, Professor Peck lists time constraints, staffing limitations and emphasis on con-
stituent service as factors tending to make systematic tort law reform a low priority item on a
state legislator's agenda.
153. Id. ("[Ain abundance of evidence indicates that the legislative environment is not
conducive to scholarly or detailed examination which is essential to effective reformulation of a
complicated area of private law."). The frequent enactment of criminal statutes without con-
current civil remedies is pointed to as further evidence of the lack of consideration for tort
problems. Id.
154. Id. at 281-85. This is known as client politics. It occurs when the benefits (or costs)
af a given policy will accrue to a relatively small, easily organized group, and the costs (or
benefits) will be diffused throughout the population. It is in the interest of the small group, the
members of which will gain or lose a comparatively large pro rata amount, to make an effort
to shape that policy to conform to their best interests. The larger group, receiving a relatively
insignificant effect, will have no motivation to act. This can at times be changed when a highly
emotional issue is well-publicized. See WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 204-29, 594-96
(1980). As Professor Peck states: "[reform] will not come because legislators spend their spare
time reading advance sheets." Peck, Reform, supra note 151, at 286.
155. See Comment, One More For the Road: Civil Liability of Licensees and Social
Hosts For Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages to Minors, 59 B.U.L. REV. 725, 732 n.55 (1979)
(providing an account of the pressure exerted by the California beverage industry in getting
civil liability abrogated) [hereinafter cited as Comment, One More For the Road]; see also
Comment, Liquor, the Law and California: One Step Forward-Two Steps Backward, 16
initiate dram shop legislation would be either small, poorly-funded
organizations or individual citizens.15 Furthermore, since most peo-
ple have either a financial stake in or a personal opinion on this is-
sue, any decision would create winners and losers - a no-win situa-
tion for a legislator. 15 7 Legislatures and legislators have therefore
historically endeavored to avoid these "hot" issues. When forced to
take action, they have normally been content to enact benign laws
that leave the tough interpretive choices to courts and administrative
agencies. 158
C. A Judicial Solution?
It is this reliance on judicial resolution of tough policy questions
that provides both the need and justification for a judicial solution to
the problem. While the confusion in the area of social host liability
admittedly results from the absence of specific dram shop legislation
and would be best cured by legislative action, a concurrent cause is
the refusal of courts to abandon their futile search for a coherent
rationale derived from legislative enactments. Courts continue to ei-
ther contrive findings of legislative intent from a hodge-podge of
statutory enactments, or defer to the policy they find so loudly pro-
claimed by legislative silence.1 59 Meanwhile, the legislature contin-
SAN DIEGo L. REV. 355, 375 n.1 12 (1979); Comment, Liability of Liquor Suppliers in Cali-
fornia: A Return to the Common Law, 12 U.C.D.L. REV. 191, 202-03 (1979). An interesting
consideration in Pennsylvania is that the Commonwealth runs a major part of the "liquor
industry." See Killing Happy Hour, Greensburg Tribune-Review, Dec. 28, 1984, at A6, col. I
("When the politicians began using the system to make money, they sacrificed the idea of
enforcing moral moderation.").
156. See Peck, Reform. supra note 151, at 282 ("The fortuitous victims of negligence
. . . form no natural or integrated economic, social, or political group.") The groups organized
to combat alcohol abuse have so far concentrated on stiffening criminal sanctions against
drunk drivers. In this area, they have enjoyed the support of the liquor and insurance indus-
tries. See supra notes 9 and 144. An attempt to initiate legislation aimed at civil liability
would cause these well-organized, well-funded, politically experienced groups to bring to bear
the powerful force of legislative inertia. It is far easier to kill legislation than to initiate it. See
Peck, Reform, supra note 152.
157. See supra note 154. Cf. Comment, Employer Liability, supra note 10, at 119
("Apparently legislators consider the potential detriment to the liquor industry and the insur-
ers of drinking establishments and social hosts to outweigh the benefit society would derive
from holding negligent servers civilly liable,").
158. See Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (book review), 81 YALE L. 575, 584-85
("when Congress is too divided or uncertain to articulate policy, it is no doubt easier to pass an
organic statute with some vague language. ); see also Peck, Reform, supra note 151, at
270.
159. Commentators generally agree that total deference to the legislature is advisable.
Professor Green states this position as follows:
Is it the part of wisdom to follow old patterns until the legislature has spoken?
And how long must the wait be in areas where the legislature has little compe-
tence and the legislators are prisoners of the political process? It is much easier
to make decisions which will support a new policy without attempting to formu-
late the doctrine too strictly or identify the policy, and this is what usually hap-
pens, leaving to further litigation the development both of doctrine and of its
underlying policy.
ues to avoid a thorny problem and the issue remains unsettled.
A realistic assessment of the political constraints of the legisla-
ture would lead the courts to abandon their deference and proceed
with a judicial analysis utilizing the pure common law approach.
This mode of analysis, including disclosure of the weighing of com-
peting policy considerations, would provide the means for developing
a coherent doctrine of social host liability.
This course would be an effective compromise between improper
"judicial legislation" and complete abrogation of judicial responsibil-
ity for tort law reform. 160 It would effectively, bridge the gap between
conceptualism and legal realism.16 It would rise above the conceptu-
alistic approaches of Klein and Congini while creating a new doc-
trine that would combine common law negligence principles with
current policy considerations. Continuity would be provided by this
explicit use of doctrine and policy in tandem, rather than the use of
one to mask the other.162 Predictable, methodical development of the
law would be ensured by the use of the standard analytical formula
but would be tempered be clearly enunciated policy considera-
tions. 6" The law would remain stable, but would be able to adapt
smoothly and rationally to changing times. The modern trend in tort
scholarship has been toward acknowledging this use of policy consid-
erations in developing new doctrines,16 4 and in recognizing the im-
Green, Tort Law, supra note 22, at 269. Cf T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 178 (H. Schneider ed.
1958). Speaking of individual freedoms in the face of legislative silence, Hobbes stated: "in
cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject has the liberty to do or
forbear according to his own discretion."
160. See generally, Green, Tort Law, supra note 22; Peck, Reform, supra note 151;
Keeton, Creative continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962) [hereinafter
referred to as Keeton, Creative Continuity].
161. The conceptualist would advocate strict adherence to established doctrine and
would be most likely to state that "the law does not spread its protection so far" or that the
problem lies solely within the province of legislative action. Pure conceptualists criticize judi-
cial activism as founded purely on policy without the sound doctrinal support needed for con-
tinuity. Pure legal realists are inclined to ignore doctrine in favor of a decisional method ad-
dressed solely to policy considerations in each case. They criticize conceptualists for failing to
articulate policy reasons, which they feel are the true source of any decision, and engaging in
casuistic distinctions of facts in order to fit their holdings within the Procrustean bed of settled
doctrine. Opinions rendered in this manner leave no real basis for understanding past decisions
other than engaging in conjecture about possible historical conditions may have motivated the
decision. See generally Green, Tort Law, supra note 22; Keeton, Creative Continuity, supra
note 160.
162. Cardozo commented on this as early as 1923, stressing the need for compromise.
See generally B. CARDOZO, The Growth of the Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO 185-250 (M. Hall ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as CAROOZO, Growth]. See
also Green, Tort Law, supra note 22, at 8.
163. See, e.g., Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, 76 Wash.2d 759, 767, 458 P.2d 897, 902
(1969) (Finley, J., dissenting) ("Adaptation of the law of torts to the myriad risk-creating
agencies and devices of modern society requires continuous application of easily understood
basic principles to a plethora of divergent and continually emergency [sic] factual
combinations.").
164. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 230-43 (1980).
portance of including these considerations in judicial opinions.' 66
In addition, this method would beneficially integrate judicial
and legislative decision-making methods by utilizing the strengths
and overcoming the limitations of each. 16  The strengths of the legis-
lature lie in its accessibility to popular opinion and control"' and its
flexibility and creativity in lawmaking. The legislature's ability to
write comprehensive legislation and create administrative machinery
for policy implementation gives it this creativity. 168 But as noted
above, in the area of legal doctrine legislatures suffer from disinter-
est, inexperience, and political paralysis. 69 Courts, on the other
hand, have the advantages of legal training and an environment cre-
ated to be conducive to legal thought.17 0 They are also less vulnera-
ble to political pressures.' 7 ' Nonetheless, courts may only decide
cases that are brought before them and can merely pronounce judg-
ments rather than enact detailed remedial systems." 2 Thus, situa-
tions arise in which courts must reform legal principles and depend
on the legislature for "fine-tuning" their future application. 73 Exam-
ples of this technique can be seen when reviewing the history of
products liability, contributory negligence and immunities. In these
areas, reform consensus developed where legislative action was not
forthcoming; the judiciary then conformed with the consensus and
legislative "fine-tuning" followed. 74 Many courts that have refused
165. Id. But see CARDOZO, Growth, supra note 163, at 226 ("The trained intuition of
the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable
legal reasons.").
166. See Comment, Social Host Liability for Furnishing Alcohol: A Legal Hangover?
10 PAC. L.J. 95, 117 (1979) ("By combining factors from judicial decisions, legislative action,
and independent thought, a truly just method can be devised to deal with injuries caused by
the overconsumption of alcohol.") [hereinafter cited as Comment, Hangover].
167. See generally Peck, Reform, supra note 151, at 296-302 (legislative and judicial
strengths and weaknesses).
168. Id. See also Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New Found Liability of the
Social Host, 49 N.D.L. REv. 67, 70-71 (1972) (discussing benefits of legislature's being able to
put a cap on dram shop liability and impose a different statute of limitations); Comment,
Hangover, supra note 166, at 113 (discussing ability of legislature to craft legislation to com-
pensate victim and impose costs on drunk drivers).
169. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
170. See Peck, Reform, supra note 151, at 297; CARDoZo, Growth, supra note 162, at
264 (distinguishing legislators and judges as between "amateur" and "professional"
lawmakers).
171. See Peck, Reform, supra notes 151, at 285 ("[even if elected, judges are not cho-
sen for their abilities to represent or respond to public pressures.").
172. See supra note 169.
173. See, e.g., Keeton, Creative Continuity, supra note 160, at 472-86. After discussing
specific instances of this technique, Professor Keeton writes: "Thus these developments may be
viewed as illustrating not merely the possibility of clash between decisional and statutory crea-
tivity but also the possibility of their serving in combination to bring about reform that neither
alone would have been likely to achieve." Id. See also Comment, One More For the Road,
supra note 155, at 746 n. 146 ("The impetus for legislative reform often proceeds from judicial
recognition that a change in the law is warranted.").
174. See Peck, Reform, supra note 151, at 287-93 and 303-12; Keeton, Creative Con-
tinuity, supra note 160, at 472-86. This technique has been exhibited in Pennsylvania in the
to impose social host liability have stated that the proposal has merit
but is amenable only to legislative resolution. 175 Given the high de-
gree of legislative inertia impeding such resolution, those courts are
in effect making that legislative decision themselves.
V. Pure Common Law Approach
A. Elements
The elements of a cause of action in negligence in Pennsylvania
are: 1) a duty or obligation, recognized by the law, which requires an
actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; 2) failure to con-
form to that standard; 3) a causal connection between the actor's
breach and any resulting injuries; and 4) actual damages or in-
jury. 176 As noted above, Pennsylvania courts have generally been
very liberal in tracing causation between the service of alcohol to a
high-risk individual and injuries caused by the individual's subse-
quent behavior.17 7 Thus, the two key elements in a suit for negligent
service of alcohol would be met by establishing that the defendant
was under a duty, and by proving that he breached that duty. The
court must therefore initially decide whether to impose a duty, and
then must discern the proper standard of care the actor must meet to
discharge that duty. Answering these questions requires an analysis
of relevant policy arguments.
The validity and strength of a policy argument, of course, rests
upon an assumption that the law in question has that policy as a
goal. 7 Tort law traces its roots back to the very origins of Anglo-
American jurisprudence, B'7  and is based primarily on compensa-
areas of sovereign and governmental immunity. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ.,
453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (abolishing governmental immunity); Political Subdivision
Tort Claims Act of 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330 § 202 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8542 (Purdon 1982) (reinstating governmental immunity with limited excep-
tions)); Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978) (abolish-
ing sovereign immunity); Act of Sept. 28, 1978, P.L. 788 No. 152 § 5110 (codified as amended
at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (Purdon 1982) (reinstating sovereign immunity with lim-
ited exceptions). See generally R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980).
175. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 90. Miller v. Moran, 96 llI.App.3d 596,
421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); accord Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (1982);
Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979).
176. See Morena v. South Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634, 462 A.2d 680 (1983).
177. See supra note 132.
178. See CARDOZO, Growth, supra note 162, at 230 ("Some theory of liability, some
philosophy of the end to be served by tightening or enlarging the circle of rights and remedies,
is at the root of any decision in novel situations when analogies are equivocal and precedents
are silent.").
179. According to Hobbes, "as men, for the attaining of peace and conservation of
themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth, so also have
they made artificial chains, called civil laws" in order to assure peace in man's interrelation-
ships. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 142, at 172. Locke states that the purpose of these laws
is "that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights and from doing hurt to one
another, and the law of nature be observed, which wills the peace and preservation of all
tion.180 Over the years, tort law in general and the negligence field in
particular have utilized various policy rationales including compen-
sation,1 81 deterrence, 82 punishment 8 ' and risk spreading or shift-
ing."" Scholars have at times debated the relative merits of these
policies in relation to specific situations and in the context of advo-
cating an ultimate goal for tort law.185 The most practical approach,
however, has been that of Prosser, who describes torts as concerned
primarily with the adjustment of the conflicting interests of individu-
als to achieve a desirable social result. 8 He lists several "factors
which affect liability," but expresses no preference for any one over
another and quickly moves on to his discussion, analysis, and synthe-
sis of cases. 8"
B. Duty
According to Dean Prosser, duty is an expression of the sum
total of those policy considerations which lead the law to say that the
plaintiff is entitled to protection.' 88 The initial determination of this
sum total is usually arrived at by considering the utility of an activ-
ity that is creating risks, the degree of the risk created (that is, the
probability that harm will result), and the gravity of the resulting
harm.' 9 Using this premise, one can arrive at an approximation of
how much cost, in terms of foregone utility, may be borne in reduc-
ing the degree of risk or gravity of harm. Statistics show that the
more serious a traffic accident, the greater the probability that alco-
hol was involved.' 90 In addition, common sense dictates that as more
alcohol is consumed by a high-risk individual his driving ability be-
comes further impaired. The probability that he will have an acci-
dent if he drives is thereby increased.
mankind." J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 6 (T. Peardon ed. 1952). In
early English law, this translated into the doctrine that a man acted "at his peril" and was
vulnerable to an action in trespass for any harm directly done by him to another. This action
was primarily penal in nature, but eventually included a damage award to the victim. PROS-
SER, supra note 34, at § 6.
180. The divorce of tort from criminal law came with the advent of the action on the
case to recover damages resulting from some culpable act or omission. PROSSER, supra note 34,
at § 6. See also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 123.
181. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
182. See Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLS. 137
(1951).
183. See WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 237 (1980).
184. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
185. See generally WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA (1980).
186. See Prosser, supra note 34, at § 3.
187. Id. at § 4.
188. See PROSSER, supra note 34, at § 42.
189. See United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) (Learned
Hand, J.); Clewell v. Pummer, 384 Pa. 515, 121 A.2d 459 (1956).
190. See Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 10, at 445.
In light of the probability and gravity of the harm resulting
from service of alcohol to a high-risk individual, a fairly high degree
of cost should be tolerated in an effort to lessen the danger. The
utility of the social consumption of alcohol is more difficult to quan-
tify. Alcohol complements foods and facilitates a great deal of social
intercourse. Nonetheless, as the quantity of alcohol consumed in-
creases, it provides less culinary enjoyment, dulls social skills, and
rapidly begins to increase the risks of injury or anti-social behavior.
In economic terms, the marginal utility of each additional drink di-
minishes rapidly and becomes negative after one reaches legal intoxi-
cation.191 Thus, the cost of prohibiting the later drinks is quite toler-
able in light of the higher cost of allowing continued service,
especially when one considers that the only burden involved is a cer-
tain amount of social awkwardness. 192 The only duty involved rests
upon the host, who must discontinue service of alcohol when failure
to do so would present a foreseeable risk of injury to others. Impos-
ing an affirmative duty to control the guest's conduct would involve
much more complicated legal problems, 193 but such is not the case.
While it is therefore desirable to prohibit excessive drinking, the
question remains whether imposing a duty on the provider of alcohol
is a proper means of accomplishing that goal. Those who are against
imposing a duty argue that by holding the drinker solely responsible
for his subsequent acts, maximum deterrence of excessive drinking
will be directed at the point where ultimate control rests.194 This ar-
gument also rests on the moral premise that one should be held re-
sponsible for his own acts and that it would be unfair to punish the
host for the intemperance of his guest. 1 5 Although this argument
has moral appeal, in reality it is the provider of alcohol who has
ultimate control over consumption and whose judgment is likely to
be affected by the threat of liability. This proposition takes into ac-
count the cognitive mental state of the actors at the time of con-
191. Marginal utility is defined as the increase in total utility that consumption of one
additional unit of a product yields to the consumer. The fact that the increase will be smaller
with each additional unit consumed is known as the "law of diminishing marginal utility." See
C. MCCONNELL, EcONOMIcs 501-02 (7th ed. 1978).
192. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). In evaluating the social
costs of imposing liability the court in Kelly reasoned that "those social dislocations, their
importance, must be measured against the misery, death, and destruction caused by the
drunken driver." Id. at 558, 476 A.2d at 1229. See also Comment, Filling the Gap, supra note
130, at 236.
193. For a detailed analysis of those legal problems, see Harper & Kime, The Duty to
Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
194. See, e.g., Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal.2d 430, 444, 629 P.2d 8, 13, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500,
505 (1981); Comment, Hangover, supra note 166, at 106. But see 9 PEP. L. REv. 784, 797
(1982) ("The notion that . . . imposing liability upon the individual drinker will drive more
carefully for fear of incurring liability.") See generally Andenaes, The General Preventative
Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 449 (1966).
195. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 549, 476 A.2d 1219, 1225 (1984).
sumption, recognizing that the one whose consumption is sought to
be moderated is in a state of diminished reason. He is therefore less
likely to think about the consequences of his acts or to be dissuaded
from acting on the basis of some amorphous threat of liability. 9
Opponents of imposing a duty further argue that by suspending ser-
vice to the drinker, the host is rendering it more likely that the
drinker will leave the party and attempt to drive. 197 While that may
be true, the converse of the proposition is that it is safer to keep
serving the individual, thus causing his faculties to deteriorate fur-
ther, while hoping that he will not try to leave. Considering the like-
lihood that a guest will eventually try to drive home,198 it seems most
prudent to stop service at the earliest time that it becomes obvious
the guest poses a lethal threat to himself and others should he drive
after leaving the social gathering.
In addition, imposition of a duty on social hosts would further
the policies of punishing socially detrimental conduct and compen-
sating loss. If hosts could be held liable, an injured party would have
a greater chance of obtaining a full recovery where the primary
tortfeasor's resources are inadequate. 199 Although a potential victim
may be able to procure adequate insurance coverage, in cases where
the injured party has not done so it would be fairer to impose the
financial burden on one who bears at least a part of the moral blame
for the innocent party's injuries. 00
While a balancing of utility, risk, and policy certainly yields a
decision in favor of imposing a duty upon purveyors of alcohol to
196. See Comment, Dram Shop Liability - A Judicial Response, 57 CAL. L. Rev. 995,
1018 (1969); Comment, Filling the Gap, supra note 129, at 259. But see DeMouline & Whit-
comb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages, 27 FED'N. INS. COUNSEL Q.
349 (1977) ("It is unlikely that this strict liability standard will deter persons from serving
liquor to minors or intoxicated persons, especially since it is doubtful that noncommercial sup-
pliers will be made adequately aware of their possible liability.").
197. See Comment, One More For the Road, supra note 155, at 737-38. The commen-
tator then proposes a standard of social host liability for service of any minor. His justification
for this is the ease with which hosts could recognize minors, the high percentage of alcohol-
related traffic accidents involving minors, and the value of prohibiting service before intoxica-
tion has occurred. This is the approach taken by Pennsylvania. It erases the distinction be-
tween social and commercial purveyors and imposes substantial potential costs upon hosts; but
then ignores the additional injuries that could be prevented by application to visibly intoxi-
cated adults. This unnecessary distinction results in a failure to prevent injuries that could be
prevented without the imposition of substantial additional costs.
198. See Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler Inc., 76 Wash.2d 759, 769, 458 P.2d 897, 902
(1969).
199. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 551, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1984). See also 9
PEp. L. REv. 784, 797 (1982) ("[B]y imposing liability upon the drinker and immunizing the
provider, the legislature has only affected the innocent third person .... ") Comment, Cali-
fornia Liquor Liability, supra note 129, at 511 ("when an inebriated patron is uninsured, or
for some reason is unable to compensate the victim, it is only equitable that a plaintiff should
have an alternative means of recovery."); Comment, Filling the Gap, supra note 129, at 232
(referring to this as the "two pockets are deeper than one theory").
200. See Green, Tort Law, supra note 22, at 6.
deny high-risk persons further access, there remains an argument
that imposing such a duty upon social hosts would be unfair. This
argument stresses the differences between commercial and social
purveyors and the circumstances under which they deal with drink-
ers. n ' The solution to this problem lies in the adoption of a proper
standard of care for negligence actions involving the service of
alcohol.
C. Standard of Care
Opponents of social host liability argue that commercial purvey-
ors of alcohol have greater expertise at recognizing and dealing with
high-risk consumers of alcohol.20 2 It is felt that the face to face con-
frontation between bar employee and patron every time a drink is
served and the existence in taverns of methods for ejecting unruly
and intoxicated patrons makes it easier for commercial purveyors to
avoid liability.203 This ignores the difference in standards used for
imposing liability. Commercial purveyors are held to a statutory
standard created especially for the environment in which they oper-
ate. Social hosts would be held to the standard of care of a reasona-
ble man under the circumstances. Thus, the unique circumstances of
each case would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the
defendant's behavior.204
The difference in standards of care is also significant to the is-
sue of the varying financial capacities between commercial and so-
cial purveyors. Critics of social host liability argue that its imposition
is unfair because tavern owners can pass the resulting cost on to
their customers and private individuals cannot. 03 It must be pointed
out that this risk-shifting concept has been used primarily as a justi-
fication for the imposition of strict enterprise liability.206 Liability
based on fault need not be predicated upon a defendant's ability to
shift his costs. In fact, the opposite is true. If costs are imposed be-
cause of one's moral fault, every effort should be made to prevent
201. See generally Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New Found Liability of the
Social Host, 49 N.D.L. REV. 67 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Extension]. Comment,
Employer Liability, supra note 10, at 137-38; Comment, California Liquor Liability, supra
note 130, at 519-20.
202. See Graham, Liability of the Social Host, supra note 34, at 568.
203. See Comment, California Liquor Liability, supra note 129, at 519. See generally
Comment, One MOre For the Road, supra note 155, at 742-44.
204. See Graham, Liability of the Social Host, supra note 34, at 580; Note, Extension.
supra note 202, at 82 (suggesting factors to be considered); Comment, One More For the
Road, supra note 155, at 747-49 (proposing that cause of action be based on "affirmative
offering" and "capacity for control.").
205. See Comment, One More For the Road, supra note 155, at 744-46.
206. See supra notes 34 and 37 and accompanying text. See also Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
evasion of those costs. 207
VI. Legislative Response
If history is any guide, judicial adoption of a pure common law
negligence action against social hosts would almost certainly bring
about a legislative response. 0 8 Yet while the arrival of that legisla-
tive response is easily predictable, its form is not. Although the legis-
latures of Iowa, 09 Minnesota210 , and California were all quick to
abrogate the judicially recognized action, Oregon codified it, 12 and
New Jersey has yet to act.213 It is also significant that the last exam-
ple of a legislative response was in 1978. Since then, the problem of
drunk driving has stimulated both national attention and national
political action. 21" Assuming heavy media coverage and balanced
lobbying efforts, 215 a wide variety of legislative responses including
those listed below would be possible.
1) Abrogation - Given public opinion, total abrogation seems
to grow more unlikely with each passing year.
2) Dram Shop Act - This would clarify once and for all who
could or could not be held liable for serving whom, and under
what conditions. Such an act could also clarify the availability
of contributory negligence and other defenses.
3) Secondary Liability - This would require that third party
plaintiffs collect as much as possible from the primary tortfeasor
before taking action against the social host.
4) Limitation on Liability - Plaintiffs would only be allowed to
recover from social hosts up to a stated amount.
VII. Conclusion
When Klein and Congini arrived for decision on the same day,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was presented with a golden op-
portunity to enunciate a coherent policy in the area of social host
liability. It is the position of this commentator that the court failed
to take full advantage of that opportunity. Lacking any clearly appli-
cable legislative mandate, the court was free to engage in a reasoned
judicial analysis of the problem as a whole. Instead, and seemingly
207. See Comment, One More For the Road, supra note 155, at 745.
208. See supra notes 46-52, 61-66, 70-74 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 1-9, 144 and accompanying text.
215. See Peck Reform, supra note 151, at 286 ("when the judicial reform is challenged
the lobbies and pressure groups will, fortunately, bear a burden absent in the usual legislative
situation - that of persuading legislators to overturn or modify the determination of a
respected boy of impartial men.").
for unarticulated reasons of its own, the court fashioned a frag-
mented rationale through selective use of disparate legislative enact-
ments. While failing to distinguish between two different classes of
suppliers, the court drew an arbitrary distinction between two mem-
bers of the same class of high-risk consumers. In so doing, the court
both neglected its duty of reasoned judicial law-making and intruded
upon the legislature's province of representative government. What
remains is a rule without a reason, and little hope for clarification.
Pennsylvania will not have a rational method of dealing with this
legal dilemma until the two branches of government begin to make
creative and cooperative use of their unique tools.
Stephen R. Thelin
